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JUDICIAL LEGISLATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
By R. Y. JNNmnes*
A major problem which faces the modern international
lawyer is that of devising machinery for the revision of legal
rights. In the words of Westlake, the problem centers round
that class of cases "in which opinion is felt to be outgrowing a
rule, so that a change in the law may be asserted in good conscience to be necessary, and yet, from the want of an international legislature, it is difficult to effect such change otherwise
than by setting the example of it."1 The day when the international community will possess a legislature in the true sense
of the word seems almost as far distant as when Westlake wrote.
Meanwhile, lawyers can but examine such primitive machinery
for international change as does exist and to attempt to estimate
its value and limitations. It is the purpose, therefore, of this
article to inquire into certain experiments which have been
made in the way of judicial legislation as a rudimentary method
of effecting international change and for grappling with that
class of cases where to enforce clear legal rights is just as clearly
inequitable; cases which illustrate what Senor de Madariaga has
called "the injustice of justice."
The Behring Sea Arbitration of 18932 is an excellent
example of the kind of dispute which cannot be settled by the
mere determination of legal rights, and it appears to have been
the first case in which the devise of legislation by the arbitrators
was employed.3 It was a controversy of long standing involving
important economic interests. The valuable fur bearing seals
of the Behring Sea had attracted both American and Canadian
* B. A., LL. B. (Cantab.); sometime scholar of Downing College,
Cambridge; Whewell Scholar in International Law in the University
of Cambridge; Squire Law Scholar of the University of Cambridge;
Joseph Hodges Choate Fellow in Harvard University; Cassel Scholar of
Lincoln's Inn. Address: 184 Highfield Road, Idle, Bradford, Yorkshire, England.
mInternational Law (2nd ed. 1910), Pt. I, 301.
2 PittCobbett, Cases on International Law (5th ed. 1931), Vol. 1,
117. 3 Moore, International Arbitrations, Vol. 1, 755.
In his speech at the closing session of the tribunal Senator
Morgan spoke of "this new and untried field of experiment". Sep
Moore, op. cit. 934. See also Renault in Revenue Gdndrale do Droit
International Public, Vol. I (1894), 44.
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fishermen. The latter adopted the method of intercepting and
killing the seals on their passage across the Behring Sea; a
method which, while causing a wasteful slaughter of the animals,
was immediately highly profitable. These operations were
carried on in the open sea well outside the three mile limit.
Nevertheless, the annual slaughter of vast numbers of the fur
seals necessarily conflicted with the interests of the American
fishing industry centered on the Islands of St. Paul and St.
George.
The combined operations of the rival fishermen
threatened, indeed, to settle the dispute in a remarkably short
time by the simple process of the complete extermination of the
fur bearing seal in the Behring Sea. But the Alaska Commercial
Company persuaded Congress to attempt the regulation of the
industry in the Behring Sea, even beyond the limits of territorial
waters. With a view to enforcing the regulations British vessels
were seized as much as seventy miles from the coast. Thus,
when it was finally agreed to submit the dispute to arbitration,
there were two quite distinct questions involved, both of which
were to be answered if the controversy was to be settled to the
satisfaction of both parties:
(i) The strictly legal question of the freedom of the seas and its
corollary of the rights of British vessels to traverse those seas
without let or hindrance.
(i) The practical question of the necessity of devising measures
for the protection of the fur seals and the preservation of the
industry from extinction. 4

In a communication of August 2, 1890,r Lord Salisbury
had offered to submit the whole matter to arbitration. Mr.
Blaine, the American Secretary of State, replied in a
letter dated December 17, 1890,6 in which, after setting forth
certain questions which it was suggested should be submitted
to the tribunal, he added that if the determination of those
questions should leave the subject in such a position that the
concurrence of Great Britain were still necessary for the protection of the fur-seal, it was further proposed that the tribunal
of arbitration should determine what measures were necessary
for that purpose. The devising of such regulations was obviously
a matter requiring technical knowledge. Accordingly, the pro4For a statement of the
Revue de Droit International,
5British & Foreign State
$British & Foreign State

technical issues involved see Barclay in
Vol. XXV, 417.
Papers, Vol. 82, 277.
Papers, Vol. 82, 277.
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posal was closely associated with a parallel proposal for the
appointment of a commission of experts. Both suggestions were
embodied in Articles VII 7 and IX8 of the Treaty of February
29, 1892. 9
The Award of August 15, 1893,10 being generally in favor
of the British contentions in the matter of legal right, regulations were adopted, consisting of nine articles, by which were
established, a zone where all seal fishing was prohibited, a closed
season for the rest of the waters of the Behring Sea, and
restrictions on the method and means of fishing, where and when
it should be allowed. The tribunal also adopted three declarations. The first suggested that these regulations should be
supplemented by further regulations applicable within the limits
of the sovereignty of each of the two powers; the second contained the proposal that the two governments should come to
an understanding with a view to prohibiting any killing of fur
seals either on land or sea, for a period of two or three years, or
at least one year; the third declared that in the opinion of the
Article VIL--"If the determination of the foregoing questions as
to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States shall leave the subject in such position that the concurrence of Great Britain is necessary
to the establishment of regulations for the proper protection and preservation of the fur-seal in, or habitually resorting to, the Behring Sea,
the Arbitrators shall then determine what concurrent regulations outside the jurisdictional limits of the respective Governments are necessary, and over what waters such regulations should extend, and to
aid them in that determination the Report of a Joint Commission, to
be appointed by the respective Governments, shall be laid before them,
with8 such other evidence as either Government may submit."
Article IX.--"The High Contracting Parties having agreed to
appoint two Commissioners on the part of each Government to make
the joint investigation and Report contemplated in the preceding
Article VII, and to include the terms of the said Agreement in the
present Convention, to the end that the joint and several Reports and
recommendations of said Commissioners may be in due form submitted
to the Arbitrators, should the contingency therefor arise, the said
Agreement is accordingly herein included as follows:
"Each Government shall appoint two Commissioners to investigate,
conjointly with the Commissioners of the other Government, all the
facts having relation to seal-life in Behring Sea, and the measures necessary for its proper protection and preservation.
"The four Commissioners shall, so far as they may be able to
agree, make a joint Report to each of the two Governments, and they
shall also report, either jointly or severally, to each Government on any
points upon which they may be unable to agree.
"These Reports shall not be made public until they shall be submitted to the Arbitrators, or it shall appear that the contingency of
their being used by the Arbitrators cannot arise."
g British & Foreign State Papers, Vol. 84, 48.
OBritish & Foreign State Papers, Vol. 85, 1158.
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arbitrators "the carrying out of the regulations determined upon
by the Tribunal of Arbitration should be assured by a system of
stipulations and measures to be enacted by the two Powers."
This method of implementing the regulations was observed by
both parties: in Great Britain the Behr-ing Sea Award Act" was
passed on April 23, 1894; the United States gave effect to the
award in an Act of Congress' 2 of April 6, 1894.
In Article 913 of the regulations the arbitrators had wisely
provided for their revision. Nevertheless, as early as January
24, 1895, Sir Julian Pauncefote wrote to the Earl of Kimberley
that:
"A strong effort is being made to reopen the whole question
of the Fishery Regulations, on the ground that the Award
Regulations are shown by experience to have entirely failed in
their object, which was the preservation of the fur-seal species,
and that, unless a speedy change be brought about in those
u4
Regulations extermination of the herd must follow.' "
This proved to be the prelude to a long dispute between the
two governments as to whether the regulations had fulfilled
their purpose. But they were finally shown to have been quite
ineffectual to preserve the fur-seals, and a treaty was signed
February 7, 1911,15 between Great Britain and the United States,
prohibiting pelagic sealing for a period of fifteen years, the
articles to take effect as soon as an international treaty with
similar stipulations should have been concluded between Great
Britain, the United States, Japan and Russia. The contemplated treaty was signed at Washington July 7, 1911,16 and the
ratifications were exchanged December 12, 1911.
A similar machinery for change, though differing in some
important respects, was employed in the dispute between Great
Britain and the United States concerning the North Atlantic
7
Fisheries.1
By the Treaty of Peace of 1783, the inhabitants
2157

and 58 Vict c. 2 (1894).

Stat. 52 (1894).
11 Article 9, para. 2.--"The said concurrent Regulations shall be
submitted every five years to a new examination, so as to enable both
Interested Governments to consider whether, in the light of past experience,
there is occasion for any modification thereof."
" 4British & Foreign State Papers, Vol. 89, 782.
2 British & Foreign State Papers, Vol. 104, 202: U. S. Treaty Series,
No. 563.
IOU. S. Treaty Series, No. 564.
II Scott, Hague Court Reports, 141.
1328
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of the United States continued to enjoy unimpaired their privileges of fishing in North Atlantic waters, in common with
British subjects. After the war of 1812 a dispute arose as to
whether the war had abrogated the treaty. On October 20,
1818, a new treaty1 8 was concluded, redefining the rights of
the United States flshermen. Article I established certain
limits within which the privileges were to continue. The United
States then renounced for ever all liberties of taking, drying, or
curing fish "on, or within three marine miles of any of the
coasts, bays, creeks, or harbours of His Britannic Majesty's
dominions in America not included within the above mentioned
limits." Differences soon arose as to the meaning and scope of
this article, and American fishing vessels were seized. The
controversy was finally submitted for settlement to the Permanent Court of Arbitration, in accordance with the General
Treaty of Arbitration, April 4, 1908.19 A special agreement
was signed on January 27, 1909,20 setting forth the questions
which were to be determined by the arbitrators. Article IV of
this special agreement had the following provision:
"The Tribunal shall recommend for the consideration of
the High Contracting Parties rules and a method of procedure
under which all questions which may arise in the future regarding the exercise of the liberties above referred to may be determined in accordance with the principles laid down in the award.
If the High Contracting Parties shall not adopt the rules and
method of procedure so recommended, or if they shall not,
subsequently to the delivery of the award, agree upon such
rules and methods, then any differences which may arise in the
future between the High Contracting Parties relating to the
interpretation of the treaty of 1818 or to the effect and application of the award of the Tribunal shall be referred informally
to the Permanent Court at The Hague for decision by the
summary procedure provided in Chapter IV of The Hague
Convention of the 18th of October, 1907."
While this article undoubtedly gave the arbitrators power
to devise a method of procedure for the ready determination of
2Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols and Agreements between the United States of America and other Powers, compiled by Malloy (Govt. Print. Office, 1910), 631.
"U. S. Treaty Series, No. 494.
20U. S. Treaty Series, No. 521.
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controversies which might arise in the future, that determination was, in the language of the article, to be "in accordance
with the principles laid down in the award." In other words,
the framers of the compromise probably did not contemplate the
article as enabling an actual modification of the law to be made,
but only for the devising of regulations for the operation and
enforcement of existing rights. 21 But it is not only in primitive
law that rules of procedure come very near in practice to being
rules of substantive law, and the arbitrators were, in fact, able
to employ these apparently restricted powers conferred upon
them by Article IV, in order to secure what was essential a
modification of the operation of the principles of law which
they themselves had laid down in connection with the first
and the fifth questions submitted to them.
The first question related to the claim of Great Britain of
the right of regulating by municipal laws the exercises of the
liberties allowed to the United States by the Treaty of 1818, in
respect of such matters as times and methods of taking fish,
provided only that such regulations were equitable and fair
between local fishermen and the inhabitants of the United States,
and not so framed as to confer any undue advantage on the
former. It was contended by the United States that such regulations might not be issued by Great Britain "unless their
appropriateness, necessity, reasonableness, and fairness be determined by the United States and Great Britain by common accord
and the United States concurs in their enforcement." In point
of law the tribunal found that Great Britain, in the exercise
of her sovereign power, undoubtedly had the right to make such
regulations as she claimed, quite independently of the United
States. But, on her own admission, both in the Special Agreement and before the tribunal, such regulations must be fair
and reasonable. It was precisely for the determination of
questions which might arise in the future with regard to such
matters, that the tribunal had been authorized to establish a
procedure under the terms of Article IV of the Agreement.
Accordingly, the tribunal restored to the very simple devise of
2 Even Judge Kellog, in his observations in the Swiss-French Free
Zones Case (infra, note 29), was willing to allow that the P. C. I. J.
might make regulations which "are merely for the enforcement and
enjoyment of the existing legal rights and obligations of the Parties".
Series A. Nos. 24, 39.
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recommending the establishment of Permanent Mixed Fishery
Commissions, consisting of a representative of each Power.
Where the national members failed to agree the matter was to
be referred to a third non-national member to be appointed
ad hoo. The total effect, of course, was much the same as would
have been a rule of substantive law that the power of making
regulations was vested not in Great Britain alone but in that
country and the United States conjointly. It is true that the
actual process of making the regulations was still vested in
Great Britain, but, in the event of a dispute, the United States
had what amounted to a power of veto where the regulation
in question could be shown to be unfair or unreasonable. In
other words, the claim of the United States that regulations
should only be made by common accord, the United States
concurring in their enforcement, was virtually allowed even
after it had failed in point of strict legal right.
The tribunal employed the powers conferred by Article
IV in still more startling fashion in connection with the fifth
question submitted to it, which was, "from whence must be
measured the three marine miles of any of the coasts, bays,
creeks, or harbours" within which limits the United States had,
in the Treaty of 1818 renounced all privileges of taking, drying
or curing fish? To this question the arbitrators could, in point
of law, give nothing more satisfactory than the following answer:
"In the case of bays the three marine miles are to be
measured from a straight line drawn across the body of water
at the place where it ceases to have the configuration and characteristics of a bay. At all other places the three marine miles
are to be measured following the sinuosities of the coast."
But the award went on to admit that though this was correct
in principle it was not very practical, and accordingly, the
arbitrators proposed to recommend a more concrete formula.
Precedents were then examined where a ten mile limit had been
adopted. Although these precedents were not sufficient to constitute a rule of international law, nevertheless, in pursuance
of Aritele IV, the tribunal recommended that:
"In every bay not hereinafter specifically provided for
the limits of exclusion shall be drawn three miles seaward from
a straight line across the bay in the part nearest the entrace at
the first point where the width does not exceed ten miles."
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Although the arbitrators describe this as a "method of procedure for determining the limits of the bays hereinbefore
enumerated," the disguise of this rule as one of procedure is
certainly very thin indeed. For, to establish the ratio by which
a dispute is to be decided is clearly to establish what amounts
to a rule of substantive law. Indeed, Drago, in his dissenting
judgment, says that the ruling is "without the scope of the
award."
But it is clear that, from the outset, the arbitrators interpreted Article IV as being designed not merely to provide for
rules of procedure for the determination of future questions on
the basis of the principles of law which they should find to be
applicable to the case, but, despite the clear language of the
Article, as a means of securing what amounted in practice to
a modification of that law in the interests of justice. Writing in
Das Reeht, 22 Professor Lammasch, the President of the tribunal,
mentioned that the case contained elements of a compromise,
"for which, however, the Tribunal had received special and
An editorial comment appeared
exceptional authorization."
in the American Journal of International Law,2 3 pointing out
that "a careful rereading of the special agreement fails to
disclose evidence of the special and exceptional authorization
mentioned by the President as justifying what he admits to be
24
a compromise." Lammasch replied in the pages of that journal,
explaining that he "alluded of course to the recommendatians
which the tribunal had proposed to both governments in virtue
of Article IV of the special agreement concluded between the
litigating Powers." Whether Article IV did in fact authorize
the tribunal to compromise in this way may be open to doubt,
but there can be no doubt that the result of their courageous
interpretation of that Article was a statesmanlike solution of a
controversy which had proved impossible of solution by the
ordinary methods of diplomacy.
The success of the regulations recommended in this case
is in sharp contrast with the almost unmitigated failure of
those reached in the Behring Sea Arbitration. The contrast
would seem to be due in no small measure to the differences of
arch 10, 1911, 147.
"Vol. V (1911), 725.
21Vol. 6 (1912), 178. See also Rechtskraft Internationaler Schieds-

sprueche, 65.
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the subject matter of the respective regulations. The arbitrators in the last named case were called upon to deal with a
highly technical matter in which the data were disputed even by
experts. It is recorded in the correspondence 25 that the expert
commissioners who visited the islands in 1891 "found themselves
unable to agree except as to a few vague general statements, and
presented Reports in which they differed widely, not only as
to the remedial measures necessary, but even as to many of the
most important facts in seal life". Where experts were unable
to agree it was hardly to be expected that laymen would be able
to devise satisfactory regulations. Even in a highly developed
system of municipal law possessing a legislature in the proper
sence of the word, it is probable that regulations governing so
technical a matter would be referred to an administrative
function. Moreover, it became evident that a satisfactory
system of regulations was only possible with the cooperation of
Japan and Russia, countries which were not parties to the
26
arbitration.
The Fisheries Arbitration also differs from the Behring
Sea case in that the tribunal was only to "recommend" rules
for the "consideration" of the high contracting parties in the
former case, and provision was made to meet the contingency
of the parties refusing to adopt such rules as the arbitrators
might think fit to recommend. Thus, these recommendations
were not legislation in any sense of the word; they merely formed
the basis of discussion for the definitive treaty subsequently concluded between the parties, 2 7 and in fact an examination of the
rules recommended in the award and those actually adopted
in that treaty reveals differences of detail. This variation of
method is important, being one way in which the machinery
which is eventually to bring the parties ad idem may be made
more elastic. A compromise which embodies such a clause is much
more likely to prove acceptable to the party which is in a position
to benefit by the strict application of the law as it stands, than
one which provides for the wholesale modification of that law,
" The Earl of Kimberley to Sir J. Pauncefote, May 17, 1895;
British & Foreign State Papers, Vol. 89, 786.
2IMr. Olney to Viscount Gough, June 24, 1895; British & Foreign
State Papers, Vol. 89, 818.
" Signed at Washington, July 20, 1912; U. S. Treaty Series, No.
572.
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and, at the same time, binds that power unequivocally to abide by
such modification, the extent of which is as yet an unknown
quantity.
Machinery for legal decision followed by judicial legislation
was constituted though not actually employed in the controversy
between France and Yugo-Slavia, concerning loans issued in
France. 28 The French Government and the Serb-Croat-Slovene
Government entered into a special agreement of Apirl 19, 1928,
in which certain questions relating to the basis of payment were
submitted to the Permanent Court. But the ascertainment of
the legal position was not sufficient to dispose of the question
since it was evident from the financial position of the Serbian
Government that certain concessions would have to be made.
Accordingly, the special agreement provided that within one
month from the decision of the legal question, the representatives
of the bondholders and of the creditor government should enter
into negotiations with a view to making equitable concessions.
In the event of the break down of these negotiations within three
months front their initiation, the question of the concessions and
of the method of giving effect to them was to be submitted to
one or more arbitrators to be appointed by agreement between
the two governments, or failing such agreement by the President
of the Permanent Court. The negotiations, however, resulted
in a convention signed July 26, 1933. Accordingly, the arbitral
machinery was never actually brought into action. It will
be noticed that this case introduced a variant of method in that
the judicial legislation was to be done by a body different from
that which determined the issue of right.
Since the jugment and opinions expressed in the Swiss.
French Free Zones Case,29 it is doubtful whether the Permanent
Court itself will ever undertake to perform such a legislative
function. This dispute came before the Permanent Court by
virtue of a Special Agreement reached between the parties in
October 30, 1924, which submitted to the court the question of the
interpretation of Article 435, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of
Versailles, dealing with the customs and economic regime of
the free zones of Upper Savoy and the Pays de Gex. It was
intended that as soon as the Court had concluded its deliberP. C. I. J., Series A, Nos. 20, 21.
P. C. I. J., Series A, Nos. 22 and 24.
L. J.-4
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ations on this question it should inform the parties of its opinion
and allow them a specified time to conduct further direct
negotiations on that basis' The court found itself unable to do
this conformably with its statute, but resorted to the device of
delivering what amounted to an interlocutory judgment in the
form of an order of the Court relative to the time to be allowed
for further negotiations, but which, incidentally, served to
acquaint the parties with the probable content of the final
judgment. On this basis direct negotiations were again instituted but without success. Consequently, it became necessary
to have recourse to Article 2 of the Special Agreement, which
provided that:
"Failing the conclusion and ratification of a convention
between the two Parties within the time specified, the Court
shall by means of a single judgment rendered in accordance with
Article 58 of the Court's Statute, pronounce its decision in
regard to the question formulated in Article I and settle for a
period to be fixed by it and having regard to present conditions,
all the questions involved by the execution of paragraph 2 of
Article 435 of the Treaty of Versailles."
But the order made December 6, 1930, revealed that the
Court was sharply divided on the question of the powers of
legislation which were thus sought to be conferred upon it.
The majority expressed the opinion that "even assuming that
it were not incompatible with the Court's Statute for the Parties
to give the Court power to prescribe a settlement disregarding
rights recognized by it and taking into account considerations
of pure expediency only, such power, which would be of an
absolutely exceptional character, could only be derived from
a clear and explicit provision to that effect, which is not to be
found in the Special Agreement".
The main objections preferred by the majority appear to be
twofold: first it was thought inconceivable that the court should
initiate a settlement of a dispute which was contradictory to the
principles which it had itself previously laid down with regard to
the same dispute; secondly, that the judgment on the legal
position would cease to have any object if it could immediately
thereafter be disregarded. In anticipating the first objection,
after referring to the Behring Sea Arbitration, the North
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Atlantic Fisheries Arbitration, and the Serbian Loans case,
Professor Basdevant, the French counsel, had pointed out that
the contradiction was only apparent, for really the Court is
asked to exercise two distinct functions.
"Mais la contradiction est purement apparante; elle n'existe
pas an fond. Et vous voyez le meme tribunal exercer successivement deux attributions differentes,-se placant, tout d'abord,
sur un terrain purement juridique, et ensuite sur le terrain de
la convenance et de l'opportunite; pour l'exercise de la mission
speciale qui lui a ete conferee d'etablir un nouveau regime
juridique."3
This duality of function is aptly illustrated by a dispute
which arose in the course of the Behring Sea Arbitration. The
first case presented by the United States contained not only
arguments of law but also evidence of facts necessary for the
determination of the regulations provided for in Article VII.
But the British case, when presented, was found to contain
nothing but legal arguments, and no evidence of facts necessary
for the determination of regulations. By the direction of the
President of the United States a protest was addressed to the
British Minister at Washington representing this as a failure
to comply with the requirements of the Treaty. Britain replied
that questions of right depended upon matters of law and not
upon the habits of seals, and that the regulations under Article
VII were to be adopted only in the contingency that the decision
under Article VI was unfavorable to the United States. Nevertheless, the British Government offered to submit the report
made by the British Commissioners under the provisions of
Article IX, and the offer was accepted. 31
The same difference was again in evidence during the argument of the case, Mr. Phelps for the U. S. A. contending that
the whole case of each side should be presented together. Sir
Charles Russell for Great Britain asserted that upon the interpretation of the treaty, the question of rights should first be
disposed of before the regulations were considered. Without
definitely committing himself to one view or the other the President asked that counsel, so far as possible in the arrangement of
their arguments, should keep separate the discussion of matters
" P. C. I. J., Series C, No. 19-1, 318.

"AMoore, International Arbitrations, 806.
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relating to right and those relating to the regulations which
might eventually be proposed. 32 This requirement that the
presentation of data relative to the two functions of the tribunal
shall be kept separate is not merely one of convenience. In
deciding what modification of the law is necessary, the arbitrators can only take into consideration those facts which are
put before them by the counsel of the parties to the dispute.
The essence of any law suit consists in the narrowing down of
a dispute to a few outstanding issues. Obviously, such a process
is entirely unsuited to be a preliminary to legislation. Hence,
the supreme importance of keeping the cases relating to law and
to regulation distinct.
The second objection of the majority of the Permanent
Court, based on the argument of redundancy, has more sub.
stance. The question presents itself, why this duality of function
at all? If it be recognized that some modification of the law
is necessary why not empower the arbitrators immediately to
devise equitable rules to govern the relationship of the parties?
The answer to this question appears to be threefold.
In the first place it will be observed that in all cases referred
to, the first part of the award, dealing with the legal question,
was a vindication of a protest against unilateral action. In the
Behring Sea case Great Britain recognized that a reglement for
the control of fur seal fishing was necessary but denied that the
United States acting alone might institute such a regime. In
the North Atlantic Fisheries case the United States demanded
to be allowed to play her part in the devising of rules governing
the fisheries. In the present case Switzerland was protesting
against the suppression of the free zones by unilateral action
on the part of France.
Secondly, this method is peculiarly well adapted to that
class of cases where there is, at the outset, some doubt as to
the law as it stands. In the Behring Sea case, notwithstanding
the confidence of the British lawyers that the legal position was
perfectly clear, the American lawyers were equally confident
of making out a perfectly good case based on the law of nature
and bonos mores. Similarly, in the Fisheries case it was by
no means obvious that the power of making regulations was
vested in Great Britain alone. Of course, where the dissatisfied
u Moore, International Arbitrations, 908.

See also id. at 912.
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party admits that she has no case based on existing legal rights
then this dual method can have no useful application. But
where the contrary obtains the question of right ought first to
be determined before modification is essayed. There can be
no modification of that which is itself uncertain and undetermined.
Lastly, in all the cases passed under review, the process of
making regulations was one of modification of the old law and
not of unrelated new legislation. The new regulations were
evolved from considerations of expediency and equity, but it
becomes part of the equity that the existing structure of legal
rights should be interfered with as little as possible consistently with the exigencies of the circumstances which make
modification desirable. Consequently, the first process of the
determination of rights, far from being redundant, becomes the
very basis of the modified system. The truth of this is singularly well illustrated by the Behring Sea case. That award
remains the locus classious of the doctrine of the freedom of the
seas; the regulations were abandoned rather less than two decades after the date of the award. Even had the latter proved
successful, the first part of the award would have remained the
fundamental law, the regulations being, as it were, the exceptions which proved the rule.
This is the answer to those who claim that the process is
33
nothing more than one of conciliation by an arbitral tribunal.
Actually, it is a process which differs considerably from the
ordinary modes of conciliation. Conciliation aims at a reconciliation of the policies of the parties; the process we are discussing aims at the reconciliation of equitable claims and legal
rights. That end is sought by the use of a judiciaZ reasoning.
A quotation from Professor Brierly is apposite:
"Reason in this context does not mean the unassisted
reasoning powers of any intelligent man, but a judicia reason,
which means that a principle to cover the new situation is discovered by applying methods of reasoning which lawyers everywhere accept as valid; for example, the consideration of precedents, the finding of analogies, the disengagement from
" This assumption seems to be implicit in the Observations of
Mr. Kellog in the Free Zones Clase. See Series A, Nos. 24, 41.

KENTUC

LAw JOURNAL

accidental circumstances of the principles underlying rules of
law already established.' "4
Thus, for instance, in the Atlantic Fisheries case the tenmile test for bays was adopted not because it was a peculiarly
convenient figure in the circumstances, nor yet because it was
most likely to please both parties, but because there was already
in the relations of the two parties considerable precedent for the
adoption of such a test. That this process does in fact differ
considerably from conciliation is shown by the fact that a dispute thus settled by arbitration is also ex hypothesi one which
had defied the ordinary methods of conciliation by diplomacy.
A more extreme statement of the conservative position is
to be found in the Observations of Judge Kellog in the Free
Zones case, where he objected that the view expressed by the
majority left it open to the Court in some future case to decide
"purely political questions upon considerations of expediency
without regard to the legal rights of the Parties". In view
of the plain language of Article 38 of the Statute of the Permanent Court that "This provision shall not prejudice the power
of the court to decide ex aequo et bono, if the parties agree
thereto," it is difficult to follow Mr. Kellog's argument that this
provision does not mean what it plainly says. But the principle
objection of Mr. Kellog appears to be that the court should
decide a case on strictly judicial lines and not admit compromise
on the ground of equity or expediency, a function which is proper to an arbitral tribunal rather than to a court of justice.
"It seems to me incontestable", he says, "that nothing could
be more fatal to the prestige and high character of a great
International Court of Justice than for it to become involved in
the political disputes pending between nations, questions which
may arise because of economic rivalry or racial, social or
religious prejudices. No principle of law can be invoked for
the settlement of such questions." It may be objected that
equity itself is a principle of law. But if by a "principle of
law" is meant a rule of strict law, then the argument, it is
submitted with great respect, contains its own refutation. No
principle of law will serve to settle many of these disputes, but
rather, taken alone, will aggravate them. The application of
principles of equity in such cases will serve to augment the
"4 Law of Nations (2d ed. 1936), 55.
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prestige of the Permanent Court rather than to lower it, and,
incidentally, greatly widen its sphere of usefulness.
In conclusion, it may be said that there is here a valuable
method of attempting to reconcile those apparently irreconcilable
,essentials of law, certainty and change. But it is a method which
ought properly to be resorted to only with the special authorization of the parties. The fiasco of the Maine Boundry Arbitration 35 is a monumental warning against the danger of an
arbitral tribunal usurping functions which it was never authorized to perform. Finally, it must be remembered that this
machinery for judicial legislation is, at the most, a temporary
devise for ensuring that the law will not become entirely stultified, until such time as the international community possesses
a legislature in the true sense of the term; for this it is not
and cannot be an adequate substitute. Its value is not permanent. It is not an end in itself but a means to an end, for it
suffers from the weakness inherent in any system whereby the
same individuals are asked to perform entirely different functions
calling for such entirely different kinds of skill, as do judicial
decision and legislation. The fact that those individuals may
have the assistance of commissions of experts whereby necessary
technical data are supplied does not really meet this objection.
The fact remains that the arbitrators themselves are left to
translate that data into legislation. That they have information
which would ordinarily be available only to statesmen does not
make them any the more skillful in using that information. As
has been well said by Sir John Fischer Williams, "it would be
the insincerest flattery to pretend that a great international
judge or lawyer is the same thing as a great international
statesman"."
Moore, International Arbitrations, Vol. I, 136.
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